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Abstract In the past forty years, numerous proposals to improve the fragmented inter-
national environmental governance (IEG) system have been developed, many of which call
for the establishment of an international environment organisation. Although governments
and scholars agree that the system needs improvement, no such substantial reform has yet
been undertaken. Based on the literature study and more than twenty interviews, this article
explains the absence of an international environment organisation, using three theories of
new institutionalism: historical, rational choice and discursive institutionalism. Through
the notion of path dependency, historical institutionalism explains how the self-reinforcing
cycle of a rather diffused development of the IEG system, characterised by incremental
changes, has made the system more complicated and prevented substantial institutional
change. Historical institutionalism also highlights power inequalities and lack of trust
between nation-states, as well as turf wars between international organisations, as key
explanatory factors hampering IEG reform. Rational choice institutionalism complements
such explanations by showing how incremental institutional changes that do not add up to
substantial reform are the result of the fact that neither nation-states nor international
organisations are interested in establishing a powerful environment organisation that might
encroach upon their sovereignty. Finally, discursive institutionalism suggests that the norm
to do at least something to improve the IEG system has prompted nation-states to create
‘‘symbolic’’ institutions. The concept of socialisation helps to explain why incremental
institutional developments within the UN system are more likely than substantial reform.
The article shows that new institutionalism theories complement rather than contradict one
another, resulting in a more holistic explanation of lack of IEG reform.
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1 Introduction
The international environmental governance (IEG) system that seeks to reduce environ-
mental degradation worldwide consists of many international environmental and non-
environmental institutions and agreements that deal with often overlapping environmental
issues. The United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), which mandate is to
coordinate the United Nations (UN) environmental activities, is closest to being the
‘‘leading global environmental authority’’ (UNEP 1997; par. 2). Other international
institutions established to deal with environmental issues include the UN Commission on
Sustainable Development (CSD), UNEP’s Global Ministerial Environment Forum (GMEF)
and UNEP’s Environment Management Group (EMG) (Kanie 2007; Ivanova and Roy
2007). There are also many non-environmental regional and international organisations
with environmental responsibilities, such as the Food and Agriculture Organisation, the
World Health Organisation, the World Bank and many others. In addition, hundreds of
Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEAs) address various international, national
and regional environmental issues, all operating with their own secretariat.
Within this complex international system for environmental governance, no single
organisation, not even UNEP, possesses the authority or political strength to effectively
coordinate all international environmental efforts (Inomata 2008). As has been long noted,
UNEP lacks authority to fulfil such a role because of its insufficient and unreliable budget;
its weak legal status; and the overlap of its mandate with those of many other international
organisations that have environmental responsibilities but are not prepared to defer to
UNEP (Tarasofsky 2002; Desai 2006; Bauer 2007; Biermann 2001; Biermann and Pattberg
2008; Andresen 2009; Drammeh 2009). While some argue that a system with loose,
decentralised and dense networks of institutions and actors is the best design for managing
global environmental problems (Oberthu¨r and Gehring 2004; Najam 2002, 2003; see also
Biermann et al. 2009; Biermann and Pattberg 2008; Kanie 2007), there is a general con-
sensus that the IEG system is not adequate to deal with the many environmental problems
in this world. Apart from insufficient coordination, factors contributing to such inefficiency
include fragmentation of the system; overlapping and sometimes even conflicting man-
dates between organisations; the lack of enforcement, implementation and effectiveness of
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IEG; the lack of an overall vision; inefficient use of resources; and the many conflicts and
imbalances that exist with other (particularly trade) regimes (Najam et al. 2006; Hoare
and Tarasofsky 2007; Elliott 2005; Lodefalk and Whalley 2002; Biermann et al. 2009;
Biermann and Pattberg 2008).
Since well before the establishment of UNEP in 1972, many proposals have been
developed by countries, UN commissions and scholars to address these areas of concern.
Many of these call for the establishment of a World or United Nations Environment
Organisation (WEO/UNEO). The proposals differ in terms of the scale of the organisation,
the functions it could fulfil, and the implications it has for the system.1 They are subject of
many academic and political debates, including within the UN system. Despite the large
number of proposals and the many debates that have taken place in the past decades, no
action has been undertaken, nor any decisions made to embark upon a substantial reform of
the IEG system, here equated with establishing an overarching international environment
organisation.2 What has happened in the past decades, however, is a rapid growth in the
number of additional (rather than overarching) environmental governance institutions that
aim to improve the performance of the IEG system, here viewed as incremental changes to
this system. As will be explained in more detail below, it has been argued that the myriad
of such institutions has not been an improvement to the system, but has instead made the
system less rather than more efficient.
This paper seeks to explain why, despite (or perhaps because of) the occurrence of such
incremental changes, no substantial reform in the form of an international environment
organisation has been undertaken, by applying the insights of new institutionalism to this
case of (lack of) IEG reform. In doing so, the paper addresses a timely topic: despite the
four decades of debates on the problems of and possible solutions for the increasingly
fragmented system for international environmental governance, few studies have been
carried out that seek to explain why these debates have not led to substantial institutional
reform.3
Lack of IEG reform can be analysed through a wide variety of theoretical lenses. This
paper focuses on the institutional aspects of the IEG system and the role actors play
therein. It relies on three variants of new institutionalism: historical, rational choice and
discursive institutionalism, in explaining policy outcomes in this case. As such, the paper is
also interesting in assessing whether these three variants of new institutionalism yield
complementary or contradictory explanations of the absence of an international environ-
mental organisation. This fills a gap in the literature, given that relatively few scholars have
sought to combine multiple theories in one analysis (Hall and Taylor 1996; Schmidt
2008a).
In explaining the lack of IEG reform, the paper focuses on two aspects that are
somewhat distinctly addressed by each of the theories of new institutionalism. First, the
paper focuses on the occurrence of incremental institutional change as opposed to sub-
stantial reform in the form of an international environmental organisation, paying special
attention to the way in which a complex institutional structure like the IEG system evolves
in what is perceived by many as suboptimal or inefficient, as explained above. Second, the
1 For a categorisation of the proposals, see Biermann (2000), Bauer and Biermann (2005) and Lodefalk and
Whalley (2002).
2 Though there are other options for IEG reform under consideration, this paper mainly focuses on the
reform option to establish a World or United Nations Environment Organisation.
3 Studies that address (part of) this question are among others Newell (2008), Vogler and Stephan (2007),
Najam (2003).
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paper seeks to explain the persistence of the IEG institutional structure, shedding light on
factors that hamper substantial IEG reform.
The analysis in this paper is based on primary and secondary sources, including twenty-
two semi-structured interviews with scholars and practitioners in the field of international
environmental governance (see list of interviewees).4
The outline of this paper is as follows. Section 2 introduces three variants of new
institutionalism and identifies key concepts that each puts forward relating to the aspects of
IEG reform identified above. Section 3 gives a historical overview of debates and devel-
opments relating to IEG reform, focusing on those within the UN system in the last four
decades. Section 4 applies the concepts identified in Sect. 2 to the case of international
environmental governance to explain lack of reform of the IEG system, in particular the
lack of establishment of an international environmental organisation to date. The con-
clusion reflects on the utility of the three variants of new institutionalism in explaining this
and assesses whether they yield complementary or contradictory explanations for the
absence of an international environment organisation.
2 The promise of new institutionalism
Theories of new institutionalism are particularly useful in explaining (lack of) policy
change, since they focus on how and why institutions originate, persist and evolve, and on
the processes of institutional reproduction and institutionalisation5 (Alley 2001). The
different varieties of new institutionalism differ significantly in how they explain institu-
tional origins, continuities and changes. Despite this, they share the same focus as well as a
common set of concerns and assumptions (Schmidt 2008a, b; Thelen 1999; Hall and Taylor
1996; Koelble 1995; Immergut 1998). These differences and similarities between variants
of new institutionalism allow for comparison of their explanatory prowess, in this case by
applying them to a specific case.
The paper distinguishes between historical, rational choice and discursive institution-
alism, much along the same lines as Hall and Taylor’s (1996) categorisation into historical,
rational choice and sociological institutionalism, and the addition by Schmidt (2008a) of
discursive institutionalism. More categorisations of new institutionalism exist, such as the
one by Peters (2005) who also identifies normative, empirical and international institu-
tionalism. Historical, rational choice and discursive institutionalism are chosen for the
purpose of this analysis, because they cover the elements most useful in explaining lack of
IEG reform, such as the influence of the institutional context on the development of
specific institutions and power inequalities between actors (considered mainly by historical
4 The interviews provided information about the roles and opinions of key actors and factors that contribute
to lack of IEG reform. The interviewees were selected on the basis of their involvement in the debates on the
reform of the international environmental governance system. Interviewees included representatives from
various UN environmental organisations and other international organisations dealing with environmental
issues; representatives from non-governmental organisations directly involved in the debates; and scholars.
The scholars who were interviewed were selected first, because they had developed proposals for an
international environment organisation, and second, because of their expert knowledge and insights into the
debates on IEG reform.
5 Though most of the varieties of new institutionalism have been developed for the study of domestic
institutions, Jo¨nsson and Tallberg (2008) show that different varieties of new institutionalism are also useful
in international relations literature. They call on scholars of international relations to continue ‘‘drawing on
institutional theories generated in the study of domestic institutions’’ (p. 21). This paper can be seen as a
response to this call.
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institutionalism); the influence of actors’ interests and behaviour on the emergence and
persistence of institutions (considered mainly by rational choice institutionalism); and the
influence of interactive processes and discourses on actors’ behaviour and the institutional
context (considered mainly by discursive institutionalism).6
This section identifies the key concepts that historical, rational choice and discursive
institutionalism provide which can be useful in explaining: first, the occurrence of
incremental institutional change; and second, the persistence of institutional structures.
Section 4 then applies the theoretical precepts discussed to the case of international
environmental governance (non-)reform in order to assess whether and how each of the
three theoretical lenses helps to explain the absence of an international environment
organisation.
2.1 Historical institutionalism
2.1.1 Explaining incremental institutional change: path dependency
According to historical institutionalism, actors’ behaviour is largely determined by insti-
tutions influencing their choices as well as their worldviews and interpretations. In
expanding on this view, historical institutionalism uses a combination of the so-called
‘‘calculus approach’’ and ‘‘cultural approach’’. The calculus approach holds that actors
behave instrumentally and in a strategic way in order to maximise the attainment of their
own interests (Schmidt 2008a). The cultural approach posits that behaviour is not entirely
strategic, but influenced by actors’ worldviews. Historical institutionalists believe that
institutions provide ‘‘moral and cognitive templates for interpretation and action’’ (Hall
and Taylor 1996; p. 939) by reinforcing some ideas or worldviews while undermining
others (Koelble 1995; Jo¨nsson and Tallberg 2008). Through this, institutions influence
actors’ behaviour not only by influencing the institutional context, and thus the ways in
which their interests are maximised, but also by influencing actors’ perceptions of what
their interests and goals are (Koelble 1995).
A key factor for explaining incremental change is what historical institutionalists call
‘‘path dependency’’. Path dependency highlights how the institutional context, which is
inherited from the past, influences developments and pushes these along so-called ‘‘tra-
jectories’’ (Hall and Taylor 1996; Schmidt 2006, 2008b; Peters 2005; Thelen 1999; Pierson
2000). Though historical institutionalism views institutions as relatively persistent, it can
account for institutional change through gradual adaption, causing ever greater change
down the path by means of positive feedback. In this way, path dependency can be a useful
concept in explaining the persistence of institutional structures and hence a lack of change
(see below) but also in explaining the occurrence of incremental change and inefficiencies
6 Normative institutionalism is not used in this paper, since many useful elements of this theory—especially
its focus on norms of behaviour—are also covered by discursive institutionalism (Jo¨nsson and Tallberg
2008; Schmidt 2008a). Discursive institutionalism was considered more useful for explaining the case of
IEG (non-)reform, because apart from focusing on norms of behaviour, it also takes account of the inter-
active processes and the way in which actors are socialised in certain institutional structures. As for
sociological institutionalism, apart from its focus on norms of behaviour, this theory mainly focuses on
cultural aspects. Although a very broad definition of the concept of culture is used in this theory, the concept
was not considered to add much to the other schools of thought in their explanation of institutional changes
within the IEG system or the lack thereof. Empirical institutionalism focuses on the way in which the
organisation of government institutions influence power structures and the political choices that are made. It
was felt that many of these elements are also covered by historical institutionalism in its focus on path
dependency and power inequalities.
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that may arise due to such change. Historical institutionalism posits that not only all path-
dependent developments necessarily mean ‘‘virtuous’’ progress, but can instead also lead
to inefficient, unintended or ‘‘vicious’’ outcomes (Lowndes 2005; p. 295), since not all
developments are purposive. As Lowndes (2005; p. 295) argues: ‘‘Path dependency (…)
creates a powerful cycle of self-reinforcing activity. The cycle, however, may be virtuous
or vicious. There is no reason to assume that the option which becomes ‘‘locked in’’ is
superior to the alternatives that were foregone’’. This can help to explain how institutional
structures can emerge and persist that are perceived by many to be inefficient.
2.1.2 Explaining the persistence of institutional structures: power inequalities
Using the concept of path dependency, historical institutionalism can explain that possi-
bilities for correcting such vicious developments are limited. Once ‘‘inefficient’’ structures
are institutionalised, they influence the trajectories or institutional developments and make
the move towards other—possibly more efficient—structures more difficult and more
costly (Hall and Taylor 1996; Schmidt 2008b; Lowndes 2005). Historical institutionalists
argue that staying on the path is more in actors’ interest, since it is less costly than
changing the path—i.e. bringing about substantial institutional change (Pierson 2000).
Hence, creating new institutions is more difficult than ‘‘de-institutionalising’’ or changing
old ones (Lowndes 2005; p. 294). This has to do as well with how institutional structures
influence power relations between actors. According to historical institutionalism, insti-
tutions influence not only actors’ choices but also the interactions between actors, since
institutions are the main fora in which political debates or conflicts take place. Historical
institutionalists generally conceive of power as actors’ position vis-a`-vis others (Schmidt
2008b). Since institutions privilege some interests—as posited by the above-mentioned
cultural approach—they can grant certain actors more access over the decision-making
process, and thus more power, than others. Historical institutionalists argue that such
power inequalities in turn influence the trajectories of institutional developments (or lack
thereof) (Hall and Taylor 1996; Schmidt 2006, 2008b; Immergut 1998; Koelble 1995;
Lowndes 2005; Steinmo 2001). Hence, power relations between actors are influenced by
and at the same time influence the context in which they are played out, which can be seen
as another instance of the way in which path dependency influences (lack of) institutional
developments.
2.2 Discursive institutionalism7
2.2.1 Explaining incremental institutional change: socialisation
Like historical institutionalism, discursive institutionalism (DI) makes use of the cultural
approach in its explanation of actors’ behaviour. Discursive institutionalism views actors’
7 In this paper, discursive institutionalism (DI) is used in its broadest sense, defined (and developed)
by Schmidt (2008b; p. 3): ‘‘Discursive institutionalism is the term I use for all methodological approaches
that take ideas and discourse seriously’’. Discursive institutionalism draws on a variety of discursive theories
(see Schmidt 2008a, b) and yet constitutes its own analytical framework. Though the author is aware
of the great variety of discursive (institutional) theories that exists, the focus on discursive institutionalism
was chosen here because of its similar epistemological status compared to the other two new institution-
alisms that are used in this paper. This made it possible to situate discursive institutionalism alongside
the other new institutionalisms and compare the three of them in their explanation of the political institu-
tional continuities and changes in the IEG system.
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behaviour as being heavily influenced by the way actors interpret the world around them
(their world view). Actors are prevented or encouraged to use, change or create institutions
in a certain way, because some patterns of behaviour are conventional or taken for granted
(i.e. have become the norm of behaviour) while others are not. This can explain the
occurrence of (incremental) institutional changes. Actors create certain routines or patterns
of behaviour (also called institutions) that they generally adhere to. In other words, actors
are socialised by the institutions in which or with which they work. Such socialisation
influences actors’ preferences, goals, the options they consider, and even the ‘‘very iden-
tities, self-images and preferences of the actors’’ (Hall and Taylor 1996; p. 939). As
Connolly (1983 in Schmidt 2008a; p. 309) argued: ‘‘institutionalized structures of meaning
(…) channel political thought and action in certain directions’’. Such directions, prompted
by certain conventions or norms, can lead to institutional changes but are not necessarily
the most optimal outcome (Hall and Taylor 1996; Schmidt 2008a).
2.2.2 Explaining the persistence of institutional structures: discursive processes
As the name already indicates, discursive institutionalism focuses mainly on the role of
discourses in politics. Discourses can mean (1) discursive processes by which ideas are
expressed and (2) the ideas that actors express (Schmidt 2008a, b). Both types of discourses
can help to explain not only institutional change, but also lack thereof. Discourses enable
actors to think, speak and act about or with institutions, and hence to change, maintain or
create them, even while these actors are socialised by and are interacting within existing
institutions (Hall and Taylor 1996). Institutions are an important influencing factor in the
interactions between actors (i.e. as the context in which actors speak, think and act), and
thus in how certain ideas are being discussed. Discursive institutionalism shows that an
analysis of the nature of these interactions—or rather discursive processes—and the
influence of institutions therein is worthwhile, since it influences their outcomes as well
as what the involved actors consider to be likely or desirable outcomes (Schmidt 2008a).
This can help to explain why certain ideas or discourses for action, such as undertaking
substantial institutional reform, are less likely to happen than other, more conventional
patterns of behaviour.
2.3 Rational choice institutionalism
2.3.1 Explaining incremental institutional change: collective action dilemmas
In its explanation of actors’ behaviour, rational choice institutionalism draws on the cal-
culus approach (see above). The calculus approach holds that actors behave entirely
instrumentally and in a strategic way in order to maximise the attainment of what they
perceive to be their own interests (Schmidt 2008a). Rational institutionalism tends to view
the creation of institutions and the occurrence of (incremental) institutional changes as
highly purposive, being established or embarked upon by actors who think this will
maximise their interests (Hall and Taylor 1996). In such a view, rational choice institu-
tionalism is rather functionalistic, putting much emphasis on the functions that institutions
fulfil and the efficiencies they display. Rational choice institutionalism can, however, also
explain inefficiencies in institutional structures by referring to deficiencies in these
structures. An example is the case of a collective action dilemma. This is a situation in
which, due to insufficient institutional structures, actors face insufficient information to
make a judgment about the optimal outcome of their actions. Actors think they act in order
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to maximise the attainment of their preferences, but end up producing an outcome that
neither represents actors’ individual preferences, nor a collectively optimal outcome (Hall
and Taylor 1996; Thelen 1999; Schmidt 2006; Immergut 1998).
2.3.2 Explaining the persistence of institutional structures: calculus approach
Using the calculus approach, rational choice institutionalism views actors interested in
maximising their own interests as central in the political process. Institutions emerge and
persist as a result of the interdependence and strategic interactions between these actors.
The survival of institutions can be explained by the fact that they fulfil important functions
that serve the interests of individual actors more than alternative institutional forms
(Jo¨nsson and Tallberg 2008; Alley 2001; Hall and Taylor 1996). Rational choice institu-
tionalism explains institutional continuity by pointing to the fact that institutional changes
only occur when actors feel that such change maximises their utility (Alley 2001). In
addition, difficulties in overseeing the consequences of change as well as the high costs of
such change can make actors reluctant to such reform (Steinmo 2001).
3 History of the debates on IEG reform
The current debates regarding the way to organise international environmental governance
date back to the late 1960s and early 1970s. The growing concerns about environmental
problems worldwide spurred the convening of the first environmental World Summit in
1972, the United Nations Conference on Human Environment in Stockholm. The creation
of the United Nations Environment Programme that followed the Summit eased the con-
cerns about ways to address these problems somewhat. Nevertheless, the structure of the
system for international environmental governance was again debated during and in the
run-up to the UN Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro in 1992.
This second environmental World Summit resulted in the establishment of the UN
Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD), the task of which is to stimulate global,
national and local action by UN bodies to promote sustainable development (Dodds et al.
2002).
Despite the establishment of yet another new body for environmental governance,
dissatisfaction with the IEG system remained (Biermann 2000; Bauer and Biermann 2005).
In 1998, the UN Task Force on Environment and Human Settlements concluded that the
IEG system had substantial overlaps, unrecognised linkages and gaps, and that there was a
need for more environmental coordination. In 1999, the General Assembly agreed to
establish the United Nations Environment Management Group (EMG) and the Global
Ministerial Environment Forum (GMEF) (High-level Forum of UNEMG 2006). Both were
an attempt to increase the coherence in international environmental policy (High-level
Forum of UNEMG 2006; Charnovitz 2002). The GMEF recommended that the third major
environmental conference, the World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) that
took place in 2002 in Johannesburg, reviews the need to strengthen the architecture for
international environmental governance based on an assessment of existing institutional
weaknesses, future needs and a set of options for reform (UNEP 2001a). Although the
WSSD called for a stronger collaboration within the UN system and underlined the need
to eliminate duplication of functions and continue the attempt for greater integration,
efficiency and coordination (High-level Forum of UNEMG 2006), scientists and
non-governmental organisations argued that the Summit did not achieve much, as it was
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unable to deliver a solid proposal and only rephrased what had been agreed upon in other
forums (Ivanova 2007a; Elliott 2005).
From 2004 to 2007, the proposal to upgrade UNEP to a fully fledged specialised agency,
a United Nations Environment Organisation (UNEO), received special attention. In par-
ticular, France under President Jacques Chirac pushed for this proposal. In February 2007,
the country convened the Paris conference for Global Ecological Governance to mobilise
international action in support for a UNEO. The conference concluded with the Paris Call
for Action, led by President Jacques Chirac. This was a call for ‘‘massive international
action’’ that—according to the call—would have to manifest itself in the transformation of
UNEP into a fully fledged international organisation (Paris Call for Action 2007). In the
same year, France managed to bring together both developed and developing nations in
the so-called ‘‘Group of Friends of the UNEO’’. This group was an effort to push for the
establishment of a UNEO by building a strong coalition and break the impasse that existed
due to differences in opinion on the future of the IEG system. Nevertheless, the group
failed to enter into serious discussions on the possibility to set up a UNEO, as the idea did
not have widespread support. The group merely consisted of about twenty-five members
and was never very cohesive (Obermeyer 2009). The Group of Friends of the UNEO
became inactive when Jacques Chirac left office in May 2007 (Haas 2009; Najam 2009;
Dodds 2009; Dadema 2009; representative MinBuZa 2009a; Obermeyer 2009; Halle 2009;
Martimort-Asso 2009).
In 2006, the High-Level Panel on United Nations System-Wide Coherence was
established. This initiative could be seen as part of the wider UN reform process for a
stronger, more effective and more coherent UN system (UN 2006). The High-Level Panel
stated in its ‘‘Delivering as One’’ report that ‘‘[t]he international system is complex, fraught
with duplication, and lacks coordination’’ (UN 2006; p. 20). UNEP was considered to be
the right organisation to set global standards and coordinate system-wide environmental
activities, but was considered ‘‘weak, under-funded and ineffective in its core functions’’
(UN 2006; p. 20). The High-Level Panel recommended that UN organisations cooper-
ate more effectively and eliminate duplication and that UNEP be upgraded with a
renewed mandate, improved funding and stronger coordination of system-wide environ-
mental policies (UN 2006). Also, the Joint Inspection Unit, an assessment of the UN IEG
system that was carried out in 2008, concluded that any future reform of the interna-
tional environmental governance system needs to build on the reform of UNEP (Inomata
2008).
As a follow-up to the Delivering as One report, the General Assembly began informal
consultations on the UN IEG system in 2006. The so-called ‘‘informal consultative process
on the institutional framework for the UN’s environmental activities’’ showed that,
although there was consensus that the IEG system needs to be strengthened to improve
coordination and coherence, there was no consensus on how this could be achieved. On the
basis of this consultative process, a draft resolution called ‘‘Strengthening the environ-
mental activities in the United Nations system’’ was submitted to the General Assembly in
2008 (GMEF 2009). The resolution was adjusted at its latest in January 2009 and was then
still a draft version. The informal consultations led to the suggestion to launch formal
negotiations by September 2009. However, the ambassadors who led the consultations and
negotiations on the draft resolution concluded in February 2009 that the progress had been
so slow that they had decided to stop the negotiations in the General Assembly altogether.
The ambassadors requested the Global Ministerial Environment Forum in Nairobi to
take over the discussions again (Reform the UN 2009; Dadema 2009; representative
MinBuZa 2009a; Obermeyer 2009). During the twenty-fifth session of the GMEF in
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February 2009, a Consultative Group of Ministers or High-Level Representatives on
International Environmental Governance was established, and the so-called ‘‘Belgrade
process’’ was launched. After several meetings, the group presented a set of options for
improving the IEG system to the GMEF at its eleventh special session in February 2010
(UNEP 2009). During this session, the consultative group identified several objectives and
functions that the IEG system should have, as well as broader reform options for the UN
international environmental governance system. A new Group of Ministers or High-Level
Representatives was appointed to facilitate the implementation of the proposed incremental
changes to UNEP as well as consider the broader reform options that were identified during
the Belgrade process. During a session of the GMEF in February 2011 the group presented
those options which received most support from governments, the so-called ‘‘Nairobi-
Helsinki outcome’’. From May 2010 to June 2012 several preparatory and intersessional
meetings and dialogues were being held to discuss the institutional framework for sus-
tainable development in preparation for the Rio?20 UN Conference on Sustainable
Development in June 2012. These meetings analysed the options described in the Nairobi-
Helsinki outcome and considered IEG reform in the wider context of sustainable devel-
opment. In the first half of 2012, informal negotiations in the UN General Assembly led to
a ‘‘zero draft’’ outcome for the upcoming conference. During the conference itself the
institutional framework for sustainable development was one of the central topics of dis-
cussion. One outcome of the conference regarding this topic was to replace the CSD with
an ‘‘intergovernmental high-level political forum’’ on sustainable development. The aims
of the forum are among others to set the agenda and build a platform for discussions on
sustainable development, provide guidance and recommendations, and improve coopera-
tion and coordination between organisations dealing with sustainable development as well
as with financial and trade organisations. Governments also recommended to strengthen
UNEP’s role by among others establishing universal membership in the Governing Council
and ensuring stable and increased financial resources (UN 2012; Global Environmental
Governance Project 2011). Though some had high expectations that the Rio?20 confer-
ence would lead to decisions to substantially reform the IEG system, with some delegates
strongly supporting one of the options of the Nairobi-Helsinki outcome to upgrade UNEP
to a UNEO, the conference did not result in many new outcomes compared to previous fora
and conferences. The outcomes of the conference are now expected to be taken forward by
again starting formal negotiations within the UN General Assembly (IISD 2012; Biermann
et al. 2012).
As is apparent from the above historical overview, actions have been taken regarding
IEG reform: many discussions and assessments have taken place, and there have been
numerous proposals to reform the IEG system. However, these debates are characterised by
very little substantial institutional change; many speak of a ‘‘deadlock’’ in discussions and
developments relating to IEG reform (Charnovitz 2005; Biermann 2009; Haas 2009; ICC
representative 2009; Andresen 2009; Halle 2009; Amin 2009; representative of MinBuZa
2009a; Levy 2009). No move towards an international environment organisation has been
made, which would constitute substantial reform of the IEG system.
4 Explaining the absence of an international environment organisation
In this section, the explanatory factors emphasised by the three variants of new institu-
tionalism discussed in Sect. 2 are applied to discuss why, despite the many debates,
proposals and assessments concerning the architecture of the IEG system, no decisions
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have been made to substantially reform this system through establishing an international
environment organisation. This analysis focuses: first, on the occurrence of incremental
institutional changes in the IEG system, focusing particularly on perceived inefficiencies
that arise due to such changes; and second, on the persistence of institutional structures like
the IEG system. Following this, the conclusion will compare and assess the three theories
in terms of their usefulness in explaining IEG (non-)reform.
4.1 Historical institutionalism
4.1.1 Explaining incremental institutional change: path dependency
Using the concept of path dependency, historical institutionalism would explain the
occurrence of incremental changes to the IEG system by studying the way in which the
(historical) institutional context pushes developments along a certain path. As shown in
the historical overview in Sect. 3, there has been a rapid growth in international insti-
tutions in the environmental arena over the past forty years (see also Ivanova 2005).
Many of these relatively new institutions were efforts by the United Nations to coor-
dinate environmental activities or discuss options to improve this coordination, UNEP
being the first one, after which among others the EMG, GMEF and the CSD followed.
The establishment of organisations within the IEG system has often been done without
due consideration of how they might interact with the overall system (UNEP 2001a) and
has to a large extent been ad-hoc, diffused and rather chaotic (Dodds et al. 2002). While
some are of the opinion that the creation of these bodies has meant an improvement to
the situation, many argue that some of these bodies only make the IEG system more
complicated and increase the overlap and duplication between existing organisations that
have environmental responsibilities (Desai 2006; Velasquez 2001). The concept of
positive feedback or the earlier mentioned ‘‘powerful cycle of self-reinforcing activity’’
(Lowndes 2005; p. 295) that historical institutionalism provides us with can help to
explain this. The concept sheds light on how the trajectory of establishing a series of
incremental institutional tinkering can lead to ever greater change along the path: more
(inefficient) institutions increase the complexity of the IEG system, which again leads to
the further institutional tinkering in an effort to improve the system. Thus, the historical
context of the IEG system warrants that incremental changes are more likely to happen
than changing or dismantling (what has earlier been called ‘‘de-institutionalising’’) old
ones, or setting up large new ones to coordinate the entire system (such as a WEO/
UNEO) (Ivanova 2005; Andresen 2001; Charnovitz 2005; Velasquez 2001; representa-
tive MinBuZa 2009b; Lowndes 2005). As the IEG case shows, not all institutional
change is efficient or an improvement to the system, since not all path-dependent tra-
jectories lead to ‘‘virtuous’’ progress. In the case of IEG (non-)reform, it has also been
argued that incremental institutional changes can be worse than no action, since such
changes have the effect of suppressing more substantial reform or ‘‘stacking’’ issues
rather than resolving them (Stone 1972, in Ivanova 2007a). As a report on international
environmental governance from the United Nations University claims with relation to the
CSD: ‘‘Critics have (…) argued that the CSD can create a ‘decoy effect’ by considering
sectoral issues that have been dealt with in more specialist fora for many years, thereby
drawing attention from, or potentially conflicting with, other international decisions’’
(Dodds et al. 2002, p. 33).
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4.1.2 Explaining the persistence of institutional structures: power inequalities
The ‘‘cycle of self-reinforcing activity’’ can also explain how a tendency to recycle debates
concerning IEG reform prevents substantial change in the institutional structure for IEG.
All regimes recycle issues to some extent, but such a phenomenon seems especially
common in the environmental domain (Dodds et al. 2002). This can be seen from the fact
that each new forum in which IEG reform is debated calls for the implementation of what a
previous forum might already have proposed (for details, see Charnovitz 2002). As such,
debates on IEG reform can resemble a ‘‘merry-go-round’’ whereby ‘‘things keep going
around in circles’’ (Amin 2009) or where ‘‘debates have been circular’’ (Scanlon 2009).
The CSD is the quintessential example of an institution that is said to ‘‘increasingly
‘recycle’ decisions already taken in other forums’’ (Dodds et al. 2002; p. 33). More
generally, the tendency to recycle is evident from the multiple environmental conferences
and debates over the years regarding the IEG system, its perceived weaknesses and
prospects for reform, which have been repeated in different fora. As the historical overview
in Sect. 3 shows, multiple declarations, assessments and resolutions have been adopted in
the past forty years that call for an improvement of the institutional architecture of the IEG
system. Rather than building up on one another, these declarations, assessments and
resolutions seem to draw the same conclusion time, and again, namely that the system
needs serious restructuring, the mandate of UNEP needs to be strengthened, overlap among
existing organisations needs to be addressed, and efficiency, coordination and coherence of
the system need to be enhanced. To date, however, no decisions have been made to
substantially address these issues. Historical institutionalism would explain this by
pointing to the way in which institutional structures guide trajectories, that is, the outcomes
of the debates, along a certain path. In this case, the path that is created represents
stagnation rather than progress towards decision-making, thereby resulting in persistence
rather than substantial change of the institutional structure, representing what many per-
ceive as a vicious rather than a virtuous development.
Historical institutionalism’s focus on how power relations shape the emergence of
institutions draws our attention to how power inequalities between countries (i.e. positions
of countries vis-a`-vis others) influence IEG reform outcomes. One hurdle to substantial
IEG reform is that some of the most powerful states (e.g. the US and China) are opposed to
or at best sceptical about such reform (Najam 2005). Furthermore, much of the conflict on
whether and how to reform the IEG system has a North–South dimension. In a speech
during a session of the GMEF in February 2009, the South-African Minister of Environ-
mental Affairs and Tourism Marthinus van Schalkwyk, for example, spoke of a ‘‘widening
trust gap’’ between North and South (Van Schalkwyk 2009; p. 1). Van Schalkwyk argued
that it was necessary to ‘‘transform the politics of distrust, break the impasse and build a
common vision for IEG reform’’ (Van Schalkwyk 2009; p. 3). As further documentation of
power inequalities and different priorities, a report from the United Nations University
stated that: ‘‘The inability of the international community to agree upon a common
approach to sustainable development governance is rooted, to a large extent, in disparities
between the perspectives and priorities of developed and developing countries’’ (Dodds
et al. 2002; p. 28). Whereas countries in the North (especially in the European Union)
would like to establish an organisation for the environment, developing countries
(including more powerful ones like Brazil) prefer an organisation for sustainable devel-
opment (Bauer 2007; Charnovitz 2005; representative MinBuZa 2009a; representative of
UN Division of Sustainable Development 2009; representative ICC 2009; Dadema 2009;
Andresen 2009).
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There are a number of reasons for why developing countries are at best hesitant towards
establishing an international organisation for the environment. First, developing nations are
concerned that an environment organisation will take attention away from issues of socio-
economic development and thus undermine developmental issues on the international
political agenda (Ivanova 2005; Desai 2006; Hoare and Tarasofsky 2007; Bauer 2007;
representative MinBuZa 2009a; Martimort-Asso 2009; Andresen 2009). Second, devel-
oping countries, which are often rich in natural resources, do not want the North to view
their resources as global commons. They prefer to highlight their sovereign rights to
develop and exploit these resources (Biermann 2002). A representative of the UN division
of Sustainable Development summarised the view of Southern nations as follows: ‘‘the
North used up everything first, and now they are telling us what to do’’ (representative of
UN Division of Sustainable Development 2009; similar statements made by representative
MinBuZa 2009b).
Developing countries are thus concerned that the establishment of an environment
organisation may prioritise Northern over Southern interests. They see an international
environment organisation as potentially another source of conditions and sanctions, pos-
sibly with enforcement powers comparable to the WTO (Biermann 2002; Charnovitz 2005;
representative MinBuZa 2009a; Amin 2009). As one interviewee noted, ‘‘southern coun-
tries fear that the North will impose their will on them’’ through an international envi-
ronment organisation (representative MinBuZa 2009a). This suggests that power
inequalities and differential priorities of the more or less powerful nation-states influence
prospects for IEG reform and are an important factor in explaining lack of progress
towards substantial IEG reform.
As explained in Sect. 2, power inequalities not only influence the trajectories of insti-
tutional developments, but the institutional context also in turn influences power relations
between involved actors. This can be seen, for example, from the fact that in 2009 the
debates concerning IEG reform stagnated in the UN General Assembly in New York,
where divisions between Northern and Southern countries on development-related and
security issues are often prominent. The outcome was to relocate the debates concerning
IEG reform back to Nairobi, under the auspices of UNEP. UNEP meetings in Nairobi are
mostly concerned with environmental issues, backgrounding conflicts over sustainable
development that is more prominent in New York (Dadema 2009; representative MinBuZa
2009a, b; Drammeh 2009).
Power struggles among international organisations—so-called ‘‘turf wars’’—also help
to explain why establishment of a new institution becomes difficult (Tarasofsky 2002;
Desai 2006; Bauer 2007; Biermann 2001; Ivanova 2005; Andresen 2009; representative
MinBuZa 2009b). Many of these organisations encroach upon UNEP’s areas of work and
are not prepared to give up their authority to UNEP or any overarching international
organisation like a WEO or UNEO, since they often have an aversion to be coordinated
(Ivanova 2005). This shows that an analysis of power defined as position vis-a`-vis others,
as emphasised by historical institutionalism, not only between nation-states but also
between international organisations, helps to explain the lack of substantial IEG reform.
4.2 Discursive institutionalism
4.2.1 Explaining incremental institutional change: socialisation
Compared to historical institutionalism, discursive institutionalism offers a different
explanation for the incremental institutional changes made to the IEG architecture over the
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last 40 years. Rather than seeing such changes as an outcome of path-dependent devel-
opments of institutional structures, discursive institutionalism would explain their estab-
lishment by pointing to the norm of behaviour to do at least something about the perceived
need to address the multiple problems in the IEG system. According to Dimitrov (2005),
the reason for incremental institutional change is that countries cannot afford to give the
impression that they are not doing something about pressing environmental issues. It is a
way to show that states are taking action on the issue of IEG reform without having to
substantially change the UN environmental governance system. One interviewee argued
that ‘‘organisational reform is the cheapest way to let others think that the UN is doing
something. The CSD and the EMG [as examples of incremental institutional changes] can
thus be called symbolic outputs’’ (Haas 2009). Another interviewee similarly argued that
the CSD was established to foster the ‘‘impression, it might even be an excuse, that
something is being done’’ (Andresen 2009). The norm to do at least something can be
explained with the cultural approach. As argued in Sect. 2, institutions or the institutional
context provide ‘‘moral and cognitive templates for interpretation and action’’ (Hall and
Taylor 1996; p. 939) by reinforcing some ideas or worldviews. In contrast to the calculus
approach (see Sect. 4.3), the cultural approach would assert that establishing symbolic
institutions is not necessarily perceived to be in the actors’ own interests, but that these
institutions are nevertheless created because actors are socialised in the institutional
context, providing them with the norm to take action.
4.2.2 Explaining the persistence of institutional structures: discursive processes
As argued in the previous section that applied historical institutionalism to the IEG case,
the debates on IEG reform show a tendency to ‘‘recycle’’ decisions. Historical institu-
tionalism helped to explain this by pointing to the path-dependent trajectories that the
institutional structure of the IEG system generated. Discursive institutionalism offers a
different explanation of this tendency to recycle, by focusing more on the nature of the
discursive processes and the role of actors therein, rather than only on institutional
structures. Discursive institutionalism would explain the fact that actors continuously
(re)produce the same debates with the proposition that actors are socialised within these
discursive processes. Since well before the establishment of UNEP, scholars, government
officials and representatives of international organisations have developed about forty
proposals and calls to establish an international environmental organisation. While none
of these proposals have been realised to date, many of them have at some point been
discussed in one or the other UN forum. Discursive institutionalists would explain this
instance of (re)producing proposals, declarations and assessments by arguing that the
actors (re)producing them are influenced by the norm to develop such declarations and
proposals for change, even though they fail to actually realise such change. The concept of
socialisation can thus help us explain how those involved in the IEG reform debates have
been ‘‘circling around the same proposals and ideas for years’’ (Dadema 2009).
Another instance of socialisation can be found in how the debates on IEG reform focus
too much on—or, as discursive institutionalists would say, are socialised towards—the
institutional question. This is evident from the fact that often ‘‘the debate is not organised
around the problem, but around the solution’’ (Martimort-Asso 2009). Institutional reform
and the numerous specific proposals and calls for such reform are the focus of debate,
without clear progress on what the problem is and what should be improved. The numerous
assessments and working groups that have been undertaken or set up in the past several
decades, and which are even now still being undertaken and called for, are indicative of the
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fact that no agreement has yet been reached on what exactly the problem is, apart from the
IEG system being ‘‘inefficient’’, ‘‘incoherent’’ or ‘‘uncoordinated’’.
Another important aspect of the nature of the discursive processes that can help to
explain the lack of change in IEG reform is that these processes (or debates) are scattered
in many different locations around the world, which results in various inefficiencies, puts
high demands on UN staff, and makes it difficult to keep in mind the bigger picture (UNEP
2001b; Ivanova 2005). As Van Schalkwyk said in a speech during a session of GMEF in
February 2009: ‘‘I believe that it is not only the system that is fragmented, but also the
debate on fixing the system’’ (Van Schalkwyk 2009; p. 1).
The concept of socialisation is also useful in explaining that—although there are other
fora in which the interactive processes concerning the reform of the IEG system take place
(such as the G88)—most discussions remain within the UN system. The political proce-
dures, dominant values and rules of the game in the UN influence possible outcomes as
well as what actors consider to be possible outcomes. Thus, actors are socialised to debate
the prospects for an international environmental organisation within rather than outside
the UN system, with the latter hardly discussed (Levy 2009). Furthermore, within the UN,
many discussions on IEG reform take place in forums, sessions or working groups
organised by UNEP. The Global Ministerial Environment Forum, for example, consists
only of environmental ministers since it falls under the purview of UNEP. A major hurdle,
therefore, is that decisions that fall outside the mandate of environmental ministries cannot
be taken within the GMEF, making it a relatively weak forum. Actors are nevertheless
socialised to discuss the structure of the IEG system within (among others) the GMEF.
Furthermore, since UNEP is so heavily involved in the discussions itself, the idea of
bypassing UNEP is not considered a viable option in these discussions. A structural
impediment to reform resulting from such dominant socialisation processes is that because
UNEP only has fifty-eight members the Governing Council of UNEP cannot decide on
reforming the IEG system. A decision to change the IEG system within the UN can only be
taken in the UN General Assembly (Drammeh 2009). This can explain why proposals
calling for incremental changes are much more dominant than the ones that advocate a
total overhaul of the system or establishment of an international environmental organi-
sation (Najam et al. 2006; Desai 2006).
4.3 Rational choice institutionalism
4.3.1 Explaining incremental institutional change: collective action dilemmas
Using the calculus approach, rational choice institutionalism holds that actors will only set
up a new institution if it fulfils certain functions that serve their interests and help them
maximise the attainment of their goals. As such, rational choice institutionalism explains
the emergence of institutions by arguing that these are created by (a set of) actors who
believe they can use them to their own advantage. In keeping with this logic, one expla-
nation for UNEP being too weak to properly fulfil its mandate within the IEG system is that
countries have decided to keep it weak (Dodds et al. 2002; Halle 2009). Most nation-states
8 One example of a G8 meeting in which IEG reform was discussed was a meeting of environment ministers
in Trieste in March 2001. The ministers stated that strengthening international environmental governance is
important to meet the challenges of the twenty-first century (Sampson 2001).
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involved in the debates around IEG reform are more concerned with safeguarding their
national interests than with collectively solving international environmental problems
(Peichert 2007; Ivanova and Roy 2007; Najam et al. 2006; Halle 2009). As Ivanova and
Roy (2007; p. 50) argue: ‘‘Conventional wisdom in international politics asserts that ‘States
use international institutions to further their own goals and design institutions accordingly’.
Fearful of infringement upon their national sovereignty, governments deliberately create
weak and underfunded international organizations with overlapping and even conflicting
mandates9’’ (see also Dadema 2009; Levy 2009). This seems to be borne out by the current
state of the IEG institutional architecture, which consists of overlapping and weak insti-
tutions. The Commission on Sustainable Development has been mentioned earlier as an
example of an institution that draws attention away from other, more powerful fora in
which decisions regarding environmental issues are made. This may further isolate such
decisions from important economic and financial issues with which these are inextricably
linked (Dodds et al. 2002). Another institution that some consider to be relatively weak is
the Global Ministerial Environment Forum (GMEF). As explained earlier, membership of
this forum is confined to only environmental ministers, which means that certain crucial
decisions regarding environmental issues cannot be taken within the GMEF. Applying the
rational institutionalist perspective would suggest that a suboptimal outcome such as an
inefficient IEG structure is in the interest of nation-states and international organisations
that are part of the IEG system. Environmental issues are not always a priority concern for
these actors, making them unwilling to give up their authority and collectively create a
powerful international environment organisation that could make the IEG system more
efficient. On the other hand, however, rational choice institutionalism may also view the
IEG system as a collective action dilemma. The insufficient institutional structure of the
IEG system may cause actors to face insufficient information to judge which actions
produce an optimal outcome for them. By trying to pursue their individual interests, actors
act in a way that produces an outcome that is collectively suboptimal or inefficient to
properly deal with pressing environmental issues. Rational choice institutionalism neither
helps us determine whether institutional structures are sufficient or insufficient for actors to
make correct judgments about the outcome of their actions, nor whether a collective
outcome is suboptimal (representing a collective action dilemma) or optimal (i.e. in the
interest of actors).
4.3.2 Explaining the persistence of institutional structures: calculus approach
A rational institutionalist perspective would suggest that a collective action dilemma may
be overcome by improving the IEG institutional architecture (e.g. by establishing an
international environment organisation). At the same time, using the calculus approach,
rational choice institutionalists believe that institutional structures are only changed or
established by means of voluntary agreements between involved actors (Hall and Taylor
1996; Thelen 1999). Improving international environmental governance or establishing a
9 Some believe that even UNEP has deliberately been denied authority (Meyer-Ohlendorf 2006; Dodds
et al. 2002; Halle 2009). Ivanova (2007b; pp. 37–38) quoted an officer who was involved in the preparatory
process for the UNCHE: ‘‘UNEP was not to take any independent environmental initiatives itself. It was not
to do things. It was to make a program but let others carry it out. In short, UNEP was to be essentially an
idea—or perhaps more accurately an aspiration—institutionalized’’.
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WEO-like body therefore requires strong political will from nation-states. As widely noted
by practitioners and scholars, such will is clearly missing (Hoare and Tarasofsky 2007;
IEG Dossier 2009; Kanie 2007; Najam et al. 2006; Charnovitz 2005; Bauer 2007; Haas
2009; Andresen 2009; representative ICC 2009; Dodds 2009; Martimort-Asso 2009;
Simonis 2009; Scanlon 2009). As Bauer (2007; p. 23) argued: ‘‘The bigger picture [in
international environmental governance] is one of consistent unwillingness amongst
governments to provide adequate means and substantive political decisions rather than
symbolic actions’’ (see also Kanie 2007). In such a view, an efficient organisation is not
politically feasible, as there is no political will among countries to create a powerful
organisation, whereas a politically feasible organisation would be too weak and inefficient
(Najam 2005; Martimort-Asso 2009; Halle 2009; Scanlon 2009). Furthermore, the topic of
IEG reform is not considered to be a very urgent matter: it is not on nation-states’ list of
priority interests. Governments prefer to prioritise other pressing issues over IEG reform,
such as international security issues, the financial crisis, climate change10 or the other
seven clusters of the UN reform process, 11 (Biermann 2009; Andresen 2009; Dodds 2009;
Obermeyer 2009; Dadema 2009). The report of the co-chairs of the consultations on
System-wide Coherence stated that they had not entered into detail on the environmental
aspects, since ‘‘[i]t is simply the case that no appetite is detectable among Member States
to pursue the Environment in the inter-governmental consultations on System-wide
Coherences’’ (Kavanagh and Mahiga 2008; p. 28). According to Najam et al. (2006; p. 50),
we currently lack ‘‘leaders whose personal ambitions align with the interests of the system
as a whole’’.
Rational choice institutionalists argue that institutional change is costly and creates
uncertainties that makes actors reluctant to initiate change. This is also the case with IEG
reform, where countries are concerned about the complexities and costs of reforming the
IEG system or establishing a specialised agency for the environment (IEG Dossier 2009).
As one interviewee argued: ‘‘There is a gap between the political discourse and what is
behind it, in terms of finance, time, idea. There is not a lot of national staff or finance
involved in the discussion. This is an indicator of the motivation.’’ (Martimort-Asso 2009).
Although France was one of the countries that strongly advocated an international orga-
nisation for the environment, it made no commitments for funding or staff for such an
organisation. An interviewee argued that he had ‘‘suspicions that they [the French] see it
[pushing for a WEO/UNEO] as a cost-free way to be seen on the right sight of environ-
mental debate. (…) There is not really a chance that the establishment of a UNEO or WEO
will happen’’ (Levy 2009).
Going beyond countries, also international organisations and secretariats of Multilateral
Environmental Agreements that are part of the IEG system have an interest in maintaining
the highly fragmented system in order to maintain their autonomy (Charnovitz 2005). They
10 Some argue that due to the concerns about major climatic changes, there is a heightened attention for
environmental issues. Others, however, are of the opinion that the issue of climate change totally dominates
the agenda and that this goes at the cost of the attention that governments spend on institutional reform of
the IEG system and the possible establishment of an environment organisation (Biermann 2009; Andresen
2009; Dodds 2009; Obermeyer 2009; Dadema 2009).
11 These include: create a strong and accessible science base and ensure its interface with policy; create a
global authoritative voice for the environment; ensure effectiveness, coherence and efficiency within the UN
system; secure predictable and sufficient funds for IEG; and ensure a cohesive approach to meet country
needs (GMEF 2010).
The promise of new institutionalism 169
123
fear to lose their work programme, budget or staff if reform of the IEG system entails
elimination of duplication among organisations (Ivanova 2005; Peichert 2007). As a result,
there is a general unwillingness among international organisations that are part of the IEG
system to be coordinated, as also explained with the use of historical institutionalism in
Sect. 4.1.
5 Conclusion
The three variants of new institutionalism analysed in this article take different approaches
to explaining policy change (or lack thereof), each of which emphasises either the struc-
tures that constrain actors’ behaviour, the power of actors to work with and change these
structures, or both. Despite their differences, this analysis suggests that the different
insights deriving from them supplement each another (see also Schmidt 2008a, b, Thelen
1999 and Hall and Taylor 1996 for a similar conclusion). This concluding section shows
that the three varieties of new institutionalism are complementary rather than contradictory
in their explanations of (1) the occurrence of incremental changes in the IEG system and
(2) the persistence of the institutional structure for international environmental governance
(see also Table 1).
Table 1 Explaining lack of IEG reform with the use of key concepts of new institutionalism
Historical institutionalism Discursive
institutionalism
Rational choice
institutionalism
Explaining the
occurrence of
incremental
institutional (and
sometimes
inefficient) changes
Path dependency helps
to explain the
emergence of a myriad
of institutions that make
the IEG system
increasingly complex
and difficult to change.
Through self-
reinforcing cycles in
path-dependent
developments, debates
stagnate rather than
trigger IEG reform,
leading to a ‘‘vicious’’
rather than ‘‘virtuous’’
process
Socialisation: the
institutional context of
the IEG system
influences actors’ world
view and can create the
norm to establish—not
necessarily efficient—
institutions or promote
incremental change
within the IEG structure
Actors purposively create
efficient or inefficient
institutions because
they think these will
fulfil functions that are
in their interest.
Through this, a
collective action
dilemma may arise in
the form of an
increasingly complex
and inefficient IEG
system
Explaining the
persistence of
institutional
structures
An analysis of power
inequalities draws
attention to a trust gap
between nation-states
and turf wars among
international
organisations, which
are a key hurdle to
change
Discursive processes
influence actors’
actions and guide them
in more conventional
patterns of behaviour
that may hamper
substantial IEG reform
Calculus approach: the
lack of political will to
substantially change the
IEG system and
incentives to retain the
status quo can explain
the lack of substantial
change in the form of
establishment of an
international
environment
organisation
170 M. J. Vijge
123
5.1 Explaining incremental institutional change
With the use of path dependency, historical institutionalism helps to explain how incre-
mental changes in the form of a growing number of international organisations create
trajectories that make the system more and more complicated and increases the overlap and
duplication between organisations. This makes it increasingly difficult to establish an
international environment organisation that aims to coordinate the entire system. The fact
that not all outcomes of path dependency are ‘‘virtuous’’ can help to explain why some
institutional arrangements that have emerged in the past forty years are thought to be
ineffective or can even create ‘‘decoy effects’’. Similarly, because not all trajectories mean
progress and because positive feedback can occur in such trajectories, there can be a
tendency to ‘‘recycle’’ decisions in inefficient institutional structures.
Critics of historical institutionalism argue that it overemphasises institutional structures
and their persistence and that it is much less able to explain why institutions emerge or
institutional structures change, apart from stating that it is the outcome of path dependency
(Alley 2001; Schmidt 2006; 2008b; Hall and Taylor 1996). Historical institutionalism’s
explanation that the complexity of the IEG system warrants the emergence of inefficient
institutions, which in turn makes the system increasingly complex and difficult to change,
can indeed be criticised for being tautological and historically deterministic. Both rational
choice institutionalism and discursive institutionalism complement the insights deriving
from historical institutionalism by focusing much more on how actors’ actions are influ-
enced by, influence and create institutions.
In its different explanation of actors’ behaviour, rational choice institutionalism pro-
vides us with another explanation for why incremental institutional changes occur, using
the calculus approach. Rational institutionalism views the origin of institutions as a result
of conscious decisions by actors, in this case countries, who want to maximise their
interest. In such a view, countries have deliberately established inefficient institutions
because such institutions serve their interests in keeping their autonomy. A critique of
rational institutionalism is that it relies on a ‘‘relatively thin’’ and ‘‘simplistic’’ explanation
of actor’s behaviour (Hall and Taylor 1996; p. 950–951). It neither helps to determine if
actors are able to judge whether the outcome of their actions is in their own interest, nor the
way in which institutions play a role in forming such a judgement (see also Hall and Taylor
1996). While rational choice institutionalism is thus not able to convincingly show whether
a collective action dilemma exists in a given case, historical institutionalism is similarly
not sufficiently clear about what ‘‘virtuous’’ and ‘‘vicious’’ developments are and who
determines whether certain developments belong to the one or the other category.
Rather than concluding that actors’ behaviour leads to collectively optimal or inefficient
outcomes, or vicious or virtuous developments, discursive institutionalism focuses on how
actors are socialised in a certain institutional context that shapes their perception of
appropriate behaviour. Using the cultural approach, discursive institutionalism provides a
different explanation for why actors have spurred incremental institutional changes, pos-
iting that actors establish institutions because they want to live up to the norm that they are
at least taking some action to improve the system for international environmental gover-
nance, even if it entails creating symbolic institutions. In other words, the institutional
context has socialised these actors into taking such actions. Though discursive institu-
tionalism seems to provide a more complete explanation of how institutions emerge as
compared to historical institutionalism, it is not able to establish in which cases and in what
ways actors are socialised in certain institutional contexts (see also Alley 2001). The extent
to which actors within the IEG system act in their own self-interest (even as this is being
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influenced by the institutions in which or with which they operate) or are guided by norms
by which they are socialised is therefore difficult to determine.
5.2 Explaining the persistence of institutional structures
Using the calculus approach, rational choice institutionalism directs our attention to the
lack of political will to establish a new international organisation for the environment as
a key explanatory factor explaining the current state of IEG reform. Rational choice
institutionalism also shows that actors are concerned about the costs and complexities
surrounding the establishment of an international environment organisation. None of the
advocates for such an organisation have shown willingness to invest sufficient resources in
its establishment. Many actors that play a role in the IEG system have an incentive to
maintain the status quo, since they have learned to use it to their advantage. To date, no
agreement between actors has been made regarding the establishment of an international
environment organisation.
An important criticism towards rational choice institutionalism is that it tends to
downplay the important influence of power inequalities in the process of institutional
change. Instead, it views the creation of new institutions as a voluntary agreement between
relatively ‘‘equal and independent actors’’ (Hall and Taylor 1996; p. 952; see also Schmidt
2006). This ignores how powerful actors can promote or prevent certain institutional
developments. On this point, historical institutionalism’s focus on unequal power relations
between actors can complement the insights of rational choice institutionalism. Such a
focus directs our attention to the way in which a trust gap between Northern and Southern
countries as well as the turf wars between international organisations within the IEG
system make an agreement on IEG reform difficult to achieve.
Using the cultural approach, DI’s focus on how actors are influenced by the discursive
processes concerning IEG reform also helps to explain that proposals calling for incre-
mental changes are much more dominant than those advocating a total overhaul of the
system. In its focus on the discursive processes between actors rather than the path-
dependent trajectories of historical institutionalism, discursive institutionalism is able to
complement historical institutionalism’s explanation on the tendency to ‘‘recycle’’ the
debates on IEG reform. Discursive institutionalism explains such a tendency with the fact
that actors are socialised in an ‘‘inward looking dialogue’’ that focuses too much on the
institutional question rather than starting with a clear definition of the problem. The
numerous assessments, declarations, proposals and calls for IEG reform are indicative of
this: actors keep on (re)producing such assessments and proposals, even though these have
not resulted in any specific agreements on what exactly the problem is, let alone on
whether and how to substantially reform the IEG system. In addition, the fact that the
debates on IEG reform are highly fragmented across different institutions and locations
causes stagnation due to inefficiency and the inability to retain a good overview of the
problem and possible solutions.
This paper showed that in emphasising either the institutional structures or the actors
that influence and create institutions, historical institutionalism, rational choice institu-
tionalism and discursive institutionalism provide very different yet complementary
explanations for why no substantial reform of the IEG system has taken place to date. This
suggests that the public policy debate can benefit from applying multiple theories in order
to arrive at a more holistic understanding of complex political processes such as the lack of
reform in international environmental governance.
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